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First principles
1.  “Market failure” pervasive in 
fisheries because of  ”common pool” 
problem.
2.  But “government failure” is also 
pervasive.
3. “Smart regulation” (e.g., ITQs) seek 
to use economic incentives to reduce 
“government failure.”
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2001:  Quota/ACE split and 
DVs
• Quota:  the permanent right, expressed 
as the % of the TACC
• Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE):  For 
any year, the tonnage of catching rights 
generated by the ownership of quota.
• Deemed Values:  A fee (per kilo) paid for 
landing fish in excess of ACE.
• Also explored self-governance.
Deemed values: Kiwi 
pragmatism
• Practical tool to allow ex post 
balancing.
• Allowed civil administration of “fees”
Administrative context
• If P (ACE)  < DV < P (fish), then pretty 
straight-forward.
• If P (ACE) > P (fish), then enforcement 
matters.
But also: Increases market 
efficiency
• Reduces total number of transactions.
• Reduces transactions costs for very 
small overages.
• Reduces inefficiencies associated with 
thin markets. 
“Standard” deemed values
• Base rate: P (ACE)  < DV < P (fish)
• “Standard ramping”  of differentials:
– 0-20% over:  Base rate
– 20%-40% over: 120% of base rate
– 40%-60% over:  140% of base rate
– 60%-80% over: 160% of base rate
– 80%-100% over:  180% of base rate
– Over 100% over:  200% of base rate
Differential deemed values














• Deemed values reduce 
transactions costs of balancing 
in multispecies ITQ fisheries for 
government and industry.
• Differential deemed values map 





industry to make/implement  decisions 
that traditionally are government’s. 
Rationale: Industry can achieve 
regulatory objectives at lower cost 
and/or increase economic value.
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Transactions costs are key.
• Collective decision-making involves 
transactions costs. 
• Value of people’s time large part of costs. 
• Transactions costs increase exponentially 
with the number of participants.
• Monitoring and enforcement are 
expensive.
• Benefits of collective action must exceed 
costs of self-governance.
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Factors that help fisheries 
self-governance.
• A closed pool of participants.  (Essential)
• More clearly defined rights (e.g., shares)
• Small numbers.
• Homogeneous self-interests.
• Non-unanimous decision-making 
structures (Essential for pools > about 20.)
• Predictable biologic systems.  High % of 
self-governance is in shellfish.
• Applicability of spatial allocation tools.
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Factors that help fisheries 
self-governance.
• Efficient enforcement mechanisms.
• A good lawyer with a fishing background.
• Learning from other successful cases.
• Cost recovery for monitoring and 
enforcement (creates opportunity for 
“easy win.”) 
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Role of Government 
Philosophy
• Economic outcomes matter.
• Willingness to shift authority.
• Willingness to enforce decisions 
from self-governance.
• Defining vehicles for non-unanimous 
decision-making.
• Flexibility and incremental 
devolution.
• Tolerance for mistakes.
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